According to the article, attackers used automated scanning software, which strongly implies they brute-forced cameras connected to the Internet with default or weak credentials. That has nothing to do with whether or not the service is based in the cloud.
This is a known problem with popular brands of security cameras sold in Vietnam, that the default configuration has an admin password of “admin” or “12345” accessible from the public Internet. They’re basically sold insecure, and rely on customers to consciously adopt a custom configuration to be secure.
Although, in order to be publicly accessible, one would imagine that they’ve had to configure their firewall to let outside signals to the devices themselves. Or maybe some kind of ddns setup.
Either way, it doesn’t have anything to do with the cloud, and the parent comment is basically right about that.
Although, in order to be publicly accessible, one would imagine that they’ve had to configure …
I’m guessing there are providers in Vietnam offering remote access accounts and apps, the same as 90% of IP security cameras on AliExpress, Amazon, eBay etc. Most of the zero config ones are authenticated with a cloud server 24/7 to enable remote viewing. This being Vietnam specific leads me to believe that the “hackers” are actually a domestic crime org selling compromised hardware; could be as simple as opening the box and obtaining device information (like the serial, MAC, or QR code) before shipping the product.
You can’t connect home system that is never connected to internet, basically make home server and hook up cameras and don’t ever connect that to internet
The problem is cameras like these, the kind that people are putting up inside their own homes, facing their living spaces, their own damn bedrooms, they’re sold to people that have this desire to be able to check in with those cameras remotely at any time, without a good reason.
The only reason my mother seems to have crap like this set up is so she can see the dogs when she’s not home. They’re just sleeping.
Internet connected, living space directed cameras are this bizarre consumer electronics trend that has no legitimate use case for like 90% of the people that rush to use it. Certainly not one that merits the security risks and the privacy invasion that they are inviting on themselves.
No I don’t. Like the first example above I can simply trojanise an executable, and release it to the public.
Once I’m on your network, the first thing I’m always going to do is see what I’m working with. That means a network and system info sweep. If I’m efficient, I already have a script to do this.
That sweep will reveal the presence of the camera. I might be interested in extortion material or I can sell this to a criminal gang, if I can get it open. I already have the camera’s MAC address, so finding the make and model isn’t too hard.
Then I might browse to it, see what system software it is running. Then I would try default usernames and passwords (people don’t always change them) and see if there are any usable exploits on the software.
If I come across a certain camera type with certain vulnerabilities a lot, making a script to autofuck these cameras is child’s play.
With that kind of background you’ve got a good advantage. You probably know how people fuck up their implementations as rookies, the next step is learning to take advantage of it.
Depending on the areas you want to get into (web, mobile, infrastructure, web3, etc) there are a lot of different training materials you can do. Most are free or very affordable.
Basic infrastructure stuff is a must, but it’s really simple. Your main tool for this will be either Nmap or massscan, both are port-scanners. You need to learn some basic flags and understand why you might want to use some and not others depending on the scenario (you probably already know at least some of this already). This is usually the first technical step in any operation.
Basic Linux and Windows command line is also a must. You don’t need to be able to do Linux From Scratch but you do need to be comfortable with Linux (and Windows) command line; if you manage to get a shell (illicit remote access) on a victim box, this is what you’ll be using to get around. An industry standard toolkit also comes in the form of a Linux distro, namely Kali Linux.
For more advanced infrastructure stuff, check out the HackTricks gitbook, it’s really helpful.
For web (not web3) based stuff, you can start with Damn Vulnerable Web App and OWASP Juice Shop. The former is far more tutorialy but the latter has all sorts of walkthroughs. Understanding why this works is important to understanding in future what kinds of stuff work, which is important when people actually put in (bypassable) protections.
If you want to go through more of a web3 route, get familiar with the Remix IDE and check out Ethernauts.
For mobiles, it’s important to have jailbroken or rooted devices, especially in the case of iOS. Check out Damn Insecure and Vulnerable App (Android) or Damn Vulnerable iOS App (iOS). The OWASP Mobile Testing Guide is also a really useful read.
Once you get comfortable, you can also check out Capture The Flag challenges hosted by other people. CTFTime is a good aggregate for these and HackTheBox is a good training ground for them.
I would generally recommend these tools before going onto certs; once you’re good at these, you’ll breeze through the certs with a light refresher on course details, however the certs are an expensive way to actually learn.
As for which certs, CompTIA Pentest Plus is a good starter. Offensive Security Certified Practitioner (OSCP) is a good mid-level cert, and CTFs are a crazy good preparation (this exam is much more practical-based than your standard exam). Don’t listen to some LinkedIn lunatics that call this a starter exam, it absolutely is not, and they probably have never taken it. It is, however considered something of a gold standard in the industry; if it isn’t a minimum requirement, it is considered VERY helpful in most job applications.
John Hammond’s got some pretty good “getting started with White Hat hacking” videos on his YouTube channel (a lot of “hack a box” and “CTF” style videos). He’s got one or two where he talks about his resume and training/classes he’s done.
It isn’t a common feature on ISP provided routers, which is what most people use. Some ISPs (example: my own) even make it exceptionally difficult to use other routers. I had to install OpenWRT on my retail router to get it, and getting that working was such a pain.
It kinda depends on the setup I think, especially when vlans and firewalls are involved, you’d likely need additional payloads to make further progress in that kind of environment IMO. Something granting persistent remote access to the compromised machine would be the most ideal option.
As always physical access is pretty much game over though lol.
My cams are only accessible via an authenticated endpoint hosted on a dedicated machine, which acts as a “bridge” between the VLAN that the cameras are on (no internet access), and another VLAN hosting internal services, like home assistant, plex etc.
Aside from physical access, the only way to access the cams (that I can think of) would be via some exploit in Home Assistant, or by brute forcing the password to (any of) my network switches to access the management VLAN, changing the VLAN the cameras are set on to something else (bypassing the routing, firewall setup, and auth “bridge” entirely). Or maybe just exploiting the bridge machine directly and dropping a payload to forward the cams out to the net via the services VLAN
With physical access, you could chop up the PoE for an external camera and using that as an ingress point - but you’d only have access to the cameras and the bridge machine unless you exploited that too. At this point the zabbix client on the bridge machine would have notified me that a camera’s dropped off the network, unless you dropped a payload to force it to return a good status lol
In general, cloud services have far better security than DIY systems.
Where are you pulling this from? These aren’t “DIY”. DIY is when you roll your own remote network access (e.g. VPN, DDNS, port forwarding, etc) or FOSS software/hardware. I’d trust most DIY systems more than any cloud provider, because most DIY systems would be LAN only or VPN accessible. The QR code authentication mentioned in the article sounds like these are generic IP security cameras of stock firmware, that utilize a cloud server to enable remote viewing over the internet. Even reputable cloud services use the same method to connect or setup individual cams to their cloud.
All of the hacked systems in this article are home based systems.
That doesn’t mean the exploits used are of no fault of the user — from the vendors authentication implementation, software, or hardware.
Maybe, but the difference is a lot more people are going to be looking to target the cloud provider than your home network. To say nothing of the fact that your videos on the cloud are subject to the terms and services that you agree to and those terms can be changed at any time. And also the fact that you can’t guarantee that the stuff you delete off of that server is actually being deleted.
a lot more people are going to be looking to target the cloud provider than your home network.
I can show you logs with tens of thousands of hits from all IPs all over the globe trying to gain access to a single NVR that has a port open on the WAN side of a network.
Besides email servers or FTP servers, cameras are the next highest thing target for attacks. The minute they go online they become a flaming red beacon for hackers.
I’d almost say your exposure is bigger in the cloud. WAY more software involved, it’s shared environment, and someone elses computer… In addition, it’s complex to properly setup. People often leave it alone once they get it working, no security test or checks.
Even IF it was because it was hosted at home, I blame the companies who build this shit. Market to end users, “super easy to use!!” But no security by default? Nuts.
Enable auto updates, randomly generated admin password (no defaults like 123456), and support for more then 3 years will go a LONG way for the average consumer.
Ok… But cloud services are centralized and have a lot more content to obtain, so that fundamentally makes them a more valuable target. This alone adds a level of relational security to maintaining a home backup of the information. Unless someone happens upon your home network and decides to hack it, or you download a file that sends up a flare, nobody is going to seek it out unless they know you have something specific they want.
If you have an IP camera system exposed to the outside, they will “happen upon you” within the hour.
It’s one of the top things searched for in wide net port scans.
But unlike those cloud services, your home network likely doesn’t have enterprise level threat detection to alert you to it, or a team of network engineers to try to guard against it.
Why the fuck are you broadcasting a beacon to come hack your network? Of course they are going to find it if you light it up like a Christmas tree with a giant neon sign. I said you set up your cameras to record locally. Only an idiot would set up a camera system with an unsecured exposed port. Hell, set up anything with an unsecured exposed port for that matter. Especially one that is an always broadcasting system. It doesn’t even matter if you use a cloud provider at that point. All they have to do is hack an network hop near your home and install a man in the middle and they don’t have to bother hacking a server farm to get your videos.
This is why you shouldn’t use cloud services for personal security, because the cloud is just someone else’s computer.
Also, quit putting unnecessary, Internet connected cameras indoors.
I seriously cannot fathom the amount of people that seem to want to put cameras up in their own bedrooms and just let them stream video constantly.
It has nothing to do with any serious home security, and everything to do with mindless consumerism. Hopefully it’s a trend that will pass.
In general, cloud services have far better security than DIY systems. All of the hacked systems in this article are home based systems.
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This is a known problem with popular brands of security cameras sold in Vietnam, that the default configuration has an admin password of “admin” or “12345” accessible from the public Internet. They’re basically sold insecure, and rely on customers to consciously adopt a custom configuration to be secure.
Although, in order to be publicly accessible, one would imagine that they’ve had to configure their firewall to let outside signals to the devices themselves. Or maybe some kind of ddns setup.
Either way, it doesn’t have anything to do with the cloud, and the parent comment is basically right about that.
I’m guessing there are providers in Vietnam offering remote access accounts and apps, the same as 90% of IP security cameras on AliExpress, Amazon, eBay etc. Most of the zero config ones are authenticated with a cloud server 24/7 to enable remote viewing. This being Vietnam specific leads me to believe that the “hackers” are actually a domestic crime org selling compromised hardware; could be as simple as opening the box and obtaining device information (like the serial, MAC, or QR code) before shipping the product.
Even if it were true; less money to be made than from a company, so less interest and investition to hack it.
You can’t connect home system that is never connected to internet, basically make home server and hook up cameras and don’t ever connect that to internet
The problem is cameras like these, the kind that people are putting up inside their own homes, facing their living spaces, their own damn bedrooms, they’re sold to people that have this desire to be able to check in with those cameras remotely at any time, without a good reason.
The only reason my mother seems to have crap like this set up is so she can see the dogs when she’s not home. They’re just sleeping.
Internet connected, living space directed cameras are this bizarre consumer electronics trend that has no legitimate use case for like 90% of the people that rush to use it. Certainly not one that merits the security risks and the privacy invasion that they are inviting on themselves.
Half the reason to own a security camera system is so you can monitor it while away. Can’t do that if the system isn’t online.
Online or cloud-accessed? Those are two separate things.
It’s going to be cloud accessed. People who install these to check on whether Mittens is sleeping aren’t setting up a domain or remembering an IP.
Bro, if I find any ingress point onto your network, I can connect to your networked cams.
Little brother downloads a Trojanised pirate copy of a game? I can connect to your cams via your lil bro’s computer.
Not patched your stuff and there was a drive-by-download and RCE exploit? I can do it through your computer.
Your firewalls are important but they aren’t impenetrable.
Yeah, but you’d pretty much need to target the person so these blanket hacks where a bunch of cameras are exposed aren’t really possible
No I don’t. Like the first example above I can simply trojanise an executable, and release it to the public.
Once I’m on your network, the first thing I’m always going to do is see what I’m working with. That means a network and system info sweep. If I’m efficient, I already have a script to do this.
That sweep will reveal the presence of the camera. I might be interested in extortion material or I can sell this to a criminal gang, if I can get it open. I already have the camera’s MAC address, so finding the make and model isn’t too hard.
Then I might browse to it, see what system software it is running. Then I would try default usernames and passwords (people don’t always change them) and see if there are any usable exploits on the software.
If I come across a certain camera type with certain vulnerabilities a lot, making a script to autofuck these cameras is child’s play.
Source: am an ethical hacker/ red teamer.
What is the recommended on-ramp for someone with a CS degree and a networking background?
With that kind of background you’ve got a good advantage. You probably know how people fuck up their implementations as rookies, the next step is learning to take advantage of it.
Depending on the areas you want to get into (web, mobile, infrastructure, web3, etc) there are a lot of different training materials you can do. Most are free or very affordable.
Basic infrastructure stuff is a must, but it’s really simple. Your main tool for this will be either Nmap or massscan, both are port-scanners. You need to learn some basic flags and understand why you might want to use some and not others depending on the scenario (you probably already know at least some of this already). This is usually the first technical step in any operation.
Basic Linux and Windows command line is also a must. You don’t need to be able to do Linux From Scratch but you do need to be comfortable with Linux (and Windows) command line; if you manage to get a shell (illicit remote access) on a victim box, this is what you’ll be using to get around. An industry standard toolkit also comes in the form of a Linux distro, namely Kali Linux.
For more advanced infrastructure stuff, check out the HackTricks gitbook, it’s really helpful.
For web (not web3) based stuff, you can start with Damn Vulnerable Web App and OWASP Juice Shop. The former is far more tutorialy but the latter has all sorts of walkthroughs. Understanding why this works is important to understanding in future what kinds of stuff work, which is important when people actually put in (bypassable) protections.
If you want to go through more of a web3 route, get familiar with the Remix IDE and check out Ethernauts.
For mobiles, it’s important to have jailbroken or rooted devices, especially in the case of iOS. Check out Damn Insecure and Vulnerable App (Android) or Damn Vulnerable iOS App (iOS). The OWASP Mobile Testing Guide is also a really useful read.
Once you get comfortable, you can also check out Capture The Flag challenges hosted by other people. CTFTime is a good aggregate for these and HackTheBox is a good training ground for them.
I would generally recommend these tools before going onto certs; once you’re good at these, you’ll breeze through the certs with a light refresher on course details, however the certs are an expensive way to actually learn.
As for which certs, CompTIA Pentest Plus is a good starter. Offensive Security Certified Practitioner (OSCP) is a good mid-level cert, and CTFs are a crazy good preparation (this exam is much more practical-based than your standard exam). Don’t listen to some LinkedIn lunatics that call this a starter exam, it absolutely is not, and they probably have never taken it. It is, however considered something of a gold standard in the industry; if it isn’t a minimum requirement, it is considered VERY helpful in most job applications.
John Hammond’s got some pretty good “getting started with White Hat hacking” videos on his YouTube channel (a lot of “hack a box” and “CTF” style videos). He’s got one or two where he talks about his resume and training/classes he’s done.
Seperate network that’s physically not connected to a network which connects to the internet or cameras with local storage.
You can’t hack into the wildlife camera in my backgarden. It doesn’t even have wifi, just an SD card.
Of course, that’s less useful if you want to check up on your house when you’re away.
That’s what I’ve been trying to say, thank you for backing me up
Vlans
not a common feature of home networks
If the compromised machine has access to both vlans, you’re still fucked
It’s a feature on mine
That’s why my security has multiple layers
It isn’t a common feature on ISP provided routers, which is what most people use. Some ISPs (example: my own) even make it exceptionally difficult to use other routers. I had to install OpenWRT on my retail router to get it, and getting that working was such a pain.
It kinda depends on the setup I think, especially when vlans and firewalls are involved, you’d likely need additional payloads to make further progress in that kind of environment IMO. Something granting persistent remote access to the compromised machine would be the most ideal option.
As always physical access is pretty much game over though lol.
My cams are only accessible via an authenticated endpoint hosted on a dedicated machine, which acts as a “bridge” between the VLAN that the cameras are on (no internet access), and another VLAN hosting internal services, like home assistant, plex etc.
Aside from physical access, the only way to access the cams (that I can think of) would be via some exploit in Home Assistant, or by brute forcing the password to (any of) my network switches to access the management VLAN, changing the VLAN the cameras are set on to something else (bypassing the routing, firewall setup, and auth “bridge” entirely). Or maybe just exploiting the bridge machine directly and dropping a payload to forward the cams out to the net via the services VLAN
With physical access, you could chop up the PoE for an external camera and using that as an ingress point - but you’d only have access to the cameras and the bridge machine unless you exploited that too. At this point the zabbix client on the bridge machine would have notified me that a camera’s dropped off the network, unless you dropped a payload to force it to return a good status lol
Does sound like a very fun exercise though tbh
Where are you pulling this from? These aren’t “DIY”. DIY is when you roll your own remote network access (e.g. VPN, DDNS, port forwarding, etc) or FOSS software/hardware. I’d trust most DIY systems more than any cloud provider, because most DIY systems would be LAN only or VPN accessible. The QR code authentication mentioned in the article sounds like these are generic IP security cameras of stock firmware, that utilize a cloud server to enable remote viewing over the internet. Even reputable cloud services use the same method to connect or setup individual cams to their cloud.
That doesn’t mean the exploits used are of no fault of the user — from the vendors authentication implementation, software, or hardware.
Maybe, but the difference is a lot more people are going to be looking to target the cloud provider than your home network. To say nothing of the fact that your videos on the cloud are subject to the terms and services that you agree to and those terms can be changed at any time. And also the fact that you can’t guarantee that the stuff you delete off of that server is actually being deleted.
I can show you logs with tens of thousands of hits from all IPs all over the globe trying to gain access to a single NVR that has a port open on the WAN side of a network.
Besides email servers or FTP servers, cameras are the next highest thing target for attacks. The minute they go online they become a flaming red beacon for hackers.
Blatantly false. Nowhere in the article does it say this.
I’d almost say your exposure is bigger in the cloud. WAY more software involved, it’s shared environment, and someone elses computer… In addition, it’s complex to properly setup. People often leave it alone once they get it working, no security test or checks.
Even IF it was because it was hosted at home, I blame the companies who build this shit. Market to end users, “super easy to use!!” But no security by default? Nuts.
Enable auto updates, randomly generated admin password (no defaults like 123456), and support for more then 3 years will go a LONG way for the average consumer.
You have a source for that?
Ok… But cloud services are centralized and have a lot more content to obtain, so that fundamentally makes them a more valuable target. This alone adds a level of relational security to maintaining a home backup of the information. Unless someone happens upon your home network and decides to hack it, or you download a file that sends up a flare, nobody is going to seek it out unless they know you have something specific they want.
If you have an IP camera system exposed to the outside, they will “happen upon you” within the hour.
It’s one of the top things searched for in wide net port scans.
But unlike those cloud services, your home network likely doesn’t have enterprise level threat detection to alert you to it, or a team of network engineers to try to guard against it.
Why the fuck are you broadcasting a beacon to come hack your network? Of course they are going to find it if you light it up like a Christmas tree with a giant neon sign. I said you set up your cameras to record locally. Only an idiot would set up a camera system with an unsecured exposed port. Hell, set up anything with an unsecured exposed port for that matter. Especially one that is an always broadcasting system. It doesn’t even matter if you use a cloud provider at that point. All they have to do is hack an network hop near your home and install a man in the middle and they don’t have to bother hacking a server farm to get your videos.
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